In this volume, G. Marian Kinget's classic work, On Being Human, can be read for the first time in light of a second, previously unpublished work, Pleasure And Pain. Taken together, these two works offer a new generation of readers a comprehensive picture of the insights, principles, and goals of humanistic psychology. On Being Human, Kinget's pioneering work, which arose from the original humanistic revolution in psychology, systematically describes the characteristics that make human beings different from all (...) other forms of life. In this work, Kinget explores man in his full nature not solely as a biological organism modified by experience and culture. She presents a person as a symbolic entity capable of pondering his existence, and lending it meaning and direction. Man is the only animal who knowingly exists in space and time, manifesting transcendental and metaphysical concern throughout history and culture. On Being Human presents the fundamentals of any valid approach to psychology as well as to other fields concerned with the individuality of the human being. It describes the specific human capacities for reflective thought and declarative language, and it discusses the unique ability of humans to devise culture and question origins. Pleasure and Pain considers the interdependence of human pleasure and pain. This idea, which leads to unnecessary fears and unwarranted expectations, goes unrecognized in a contemporary western society focused on the accumulation of pleasure without any awareness of the duality of the pleasure-pain experience. Kinget refutes the widespread fallacy that fun lies in the means, when it actually lies in the subject, and she discusses the human potential for autonomous "management" of the pleasure-pain dimension of human existence. (shrink)

This article demonstrates that ritual plays an ambivalent role in the interaction between religion and violence. Ritual triggers and gives meaning to violence, or it enforces peace and coexistence. The first part of the article defines the ambivalence of ritual in the context of violence. The second part surveys standard rituals of peace and violence from Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The third part focuses on the ambivalent nature of Orthodox Christian rituals.

Using a religious studies methodology, this paper offers a detailed contextual mapping and a structural configuration of how collective violence is justified in Orthodox Christianity. The research design is explanatory, whereby the functional perspectives of doctrine, ethics and worship are all investigated and probed as phenomena of lived religion and orthopraxy. While predominantly initiatory and pedagogical, the paper also proposes a systematic platform for advanced research on this subject, by flagging contexts, themes and areas of inquiry that a researcher might (...) examine in order to untangle the inner workings of the justification of violence in the mind of the Orthodox. Given the ongoing Russian War on Ukraine, relevant samples are drawn from this case.Contribution: This paper outlines the Orthodox Christian justification of violence from the perspectives of doctrine, ethics and ritual and identifies pivotal areas of ambiguity between orthodoxy and orthopraxy. (shrink)

While the majority of organised religions determine the origins of religion itself in an act of divine revelation, social science literature takes an evolutionary perspective. Without engaging the question of origin of religion from either perspective, this article proposes seven correlations between interpersonal violence and the progression of organised religion by suggesting that interpersonal violence plays a significant role in the institutionalising process of organised religion. Although interpersonal violence does not necessarily cause the structuring of faith, it reinforces and provides (...) solutions to the existing patterns of threat faced by the community, which together lead to the organisation of religion. The first part of this article (stages 1–4) surveys the psychology of violence by focusing on the theories of frustration–aggression, mimetic rivalry, triangulation and the genesis of scapegoating and guilt. The second part (stages 5–6) marks the transition from personal to social psychology and surveys violence in the primitive religion, as manifested in the ritualising process of the scapegoat, and the genesis of sacrifice. The third part (stage 7) highlights the complexity of ritual, ethics and doctrine, in the evolution of religion from a primitive state to an advanced organised institution. (shrink)

What is the temporal course of gratitude and indebtedness and how do these feelings influence helping in the context of reciprocity? In an online-game tapping real-life behaviour, Study 1 (N = 106) finds that while gratitude towards a benefactor remains elevated after an opportunity to reciprocate, indebtedness declines along with helping. Yet, indebtedness rather than gratitude better predicts real-life helping of a benefactor. Using a vignette-based experiment, Study 2 (N = 217) finds that after reciprocation indebtedness and likelihood of helping (...) a benefactor reset to a baseline level while gratitude endures. Furthermore, the decrease in helping after reciprocation is better explained by indebtedness than by gratitude. Study 3 (N = 217) assessed the unique influences of gratitude and indebtedness on helping by comparing contexts in which gratitude is at a baseline level but indebtedness is elevated (e.g. before a monetary payment for a service received) to contexts in which indebtedness is at a baseline level but gratitude is elevated (e.g. after reciprocation of benefits freely given by a friend). People are more likely to help in the former compared to latter context, and this difference is better explained by indebtedness rather than by gratitude. We discuss the interrelated and understudied relationships between gratitude, indebtedness, and reciprocity. (shrink)

The issue of the crisis of democracy has been debated abundantly and intensively in recent years. The body of academic literature on the topic has gradually increased. However, a similar debate took place almost one-hundred years ago in the Central European region. At that time, the debate was closely intertwined with the geopolitical situation, especially with the rise of fascism and Nazism. The paper conceptualizes the intellectual discussion on the reasons of the democratic crisis in the 1930s in Czechoslovakia from (...) a sociological and philosophical perspective. The opinions of important Czech intellectuals, such as František Modráček, Emanuel Rádl, Karel Čapek, Edvard Beneš, František Žilka, F.X. Šalda, T.G. Masaryk, J.B. Kozák, and J.L. Fischer, are clarified. Furthermore, some main features of the nature of the past and present crises of democracy are compared. (shrink)

Experiential education produces numerous benefits to students in terms of higher order thinking skills such as the ability to evaluate, analyze, and synthesizeinformation , engagement , and work-readiness . Partnering with community organizations provides a means to create experiential education opportunities for students. In this symposium, we discussed three examples of experiential education to promote learning around themes of sustainability, providing a brief outline of the activities, the intended outcomes, and the lessons learned from our experiences. We concluded with a (...) meditation on the importance of working with community partners and managing expectations so that students, the community, and the institutions gain the best possible outcomes when creating town-gown partnerships for sustainability education. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that contextualism cannot explain (dis)agreements concerning matters of personal taste because it treats sentences involving predicates of taste as indexical. I aim to weaken this charge. Given the idea that people sometimes use indexical sentences to express (dis)agreements about taste, two kinds of (dis)agreement are distinguished, namely doxastic and non-doxastic. Taste (dis)agreements are better explained in terms of the later kind, in which case they become amenable to contextualist treatment. It is argued that if something instantiates (...) a taste property (like being tasty for A), it has to instantiate a corresponding attitudinal property (like being liked by A). Based on this, utterances of taste sentences express propositions that concern tastiness of something (e.g., that X is tasty for A) and these propositions entail other propositions that concern non-doxastic attitudes the speakers bear toward something (e.g., that X is liked by A). One speaker is claimed to (dis)agree with another speaker provided their respective entailed propositions feature (in)compatible non-doxastic attitudes. Although this explanation is similar to hybrid accounts that are currently growing in popularity, it departs from them in some notable respects. (shrink)

« Lorsque la philosophie peint sa grisaille dans la grisaille, une manifestation de la vie achève de vieillir. On ne peut pas la rajeunir avec du gris sur du gris, mais seulement la connaître. Ce n’est qu’au début du crépuscule que la chouette de Minerve prend son vol. » G. F. W. Hegel, Principes de la philosophie du droit La métaphore de Hegel concernant le retard de la philosophie sur le réel pourrait s’appliquer aussi au cas de l’anthropologie du socialisme (...) réel qui émerge comme champ de t.. (shrink)

Ludwig Feuerbach, the German philosopher and a founding member of the Young Hegelians, a group of radical thinkers influenced by G. W. F. Hegel, was an outspoken critic of religion, and the 1841 publication of this work established his reputation. In the first part of the book he examines what he calls the 'anthropological essence' of religion, and in the second he looks at its 'false or theological essence', arguing that the idea of God is a manifestation of human consciousness. (...) These ideas provoked strong reactions in Germany, and soon other European intellectuals wanted to read Feuerbach's book. The 1843 second edition was translated by Marian Evans - who would become better known by her pen name of George Eliot - and published in Britain in 1854. Evans was influenced by Feuerbach's work, and many of his humanist ideas about religion are reflected in her novels. (shrink)

The problem of the possible occurrence of silicon porphyrins in the living organisms has been put forward in the context of the hypothesis of siliceous life forms and the study of the molecular evolution of porphyrin systems. Some properties of the tetrapyrrole complexes of silicon as well as essential data and theories from domains of silicon biochemistry and paleobiochemistry have been reviewed.This has been a basis for doing some extrapolations and showing connections with bioelectronics, whereas some possible functions of hypothetical (...) Si-porphyrins in biostructures, e.g. catalytic ones, have been shown. In the bioplasma concept, a possible use of Si-tetrapyrrole complexes as a model useful in the study of the plasma mechanism of enzymatic catalysis has been proposed, and a role of silicon analogues of chlorophyll-like compounds in primordial photosynthesis has been suggested. (shrink)

Th e present paper examines three kinds of theories concerning the rigidity of general terms—extensionalist, essentialist and intensionalist theories. It is argued that both essentialist and intensionalist theories cannot deal successfully with a number of problems and that the notions of rigidity they propose for general terms lack suffi cient explanatory power. A version of the extensionalist theory, supplemented with a hierarchy of intensions, is defended. Th e theory has surprising consequences, e.g., that ‘tiger’ and some other natural kind terms (...) are, contrary to the widespread opinion, non-rigid. (shrink)

The paper is aimed to show that directly referring terms have to be rigid designators. Since directly referring expressions refer to something on the basis of semantic conventions alone and since the conventions are independent of possible worlds, there cannot be a directly referring expression with shifting reference across possible worlds. Although this claim seems to be indubitable and widely recognized, it was questioned recently. Drawing on D. Lewis’ ontology of counterparts, G. Martí has shown that a directly referring expression (...) is capable to refer to different objects in different possible worlds. A directly referring term designating an object in our world is supposed to designate its counterparts in other possible world. The paper tries to show that the purported directly referring terms assumed by Martí’s argument are not, in fact, directly referring.U ovome članku nastoji se pokazati da izravno referirajući termini moraju biti kruti označitelji. Budući da izravno referirajući izrazi referiraju na nešto samo na osnovi semantičkih konvencija i budući da su konvencije neovisne o mogućim svjetovima, ne može postojati izravno referirajući izraz s referencijom koja se pomiče duž mogućih svjetova. Iako se ta tvrdnja čini neprijepornom i široko prihvaćenom, u novije je vrijeme dovedena u pitanje. Oslanjajući se na Lewisovu ontologiju parnjakâ, G. Martí je pokazala da izravno referirajući izraz može referirati na različite predmete u različitim mogućim svjetovima. Izravno referirajući termin koji označava predmet u našem svijetu trebao bi označavati svoje parnjake u drugome mogućem svijetu. U članku se pokušava pokazati da navodno izravno referirajući termini koji su pretpostavljeni Martínim argumentom zapravo nisu izravno referirajući. (shrink)

Though Fregeś second semantical theory is worked out excellently, he did not precisely and explicitly answer the question, which of the two semantical notions he used in his semantics - sense and reference -, could be taken as proper explication of an intuitive notion of meaning. Intuitively, meaning of a word can be connected with an understanding of the word: if we understand the word, we know its meaning. Our problem seems to be accute in connection with present tendency to (...) render words "meaning" and "význam" as proper translations of German word "Bedeutung", used by Frege to refer to named or signed objects . Fregeś basic concepts of both periods of developing of his thinking - Inhalt, Sinn and Bedeutung -, having been outlined, the author tries to explicate this intuitive notion of meaning as wordś content, or wordś sense and reference, respectively. This attempt is aimed to give a possible Fregeś answer to the above question. Then the discussion about a few counter-arguments follows and its main profit is in illumination of some less clear aspects of our interpretation of Fregeś conceptual apparatus. In the end the author argues that the word "meaning" as translation of "Bedeutung" does not cohere with Fregeś possible intentions, and defends the words like e. g. "denotation" as much better and clearer translations than the above one. (shrink)

1. Sae sidae rŭl yŏrŏ gan saramdŭl -- 2. Ŏdum ŭi sidae.

Recensiòn del libro Jacques Ellul de Carlos Díaz.

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

Parallel language activation in bilinguals leads to competition between languages. Experience managing this interference may aid novel language learning by improving the ability to suppress competition from known languages. To investigate the effect of bilingualism on the ability to control native-language interference, monolinguals and bilinguals were taught an artificial language designed to elicit between-language competition. Partial activation of interlingual competitors was assessed with eye-tracking and mouse-tracking during a word recognition task in the novel language. Eye-tracking results showed that monolinguals looked (...) at competitors more than bilinguals, and for a longer duration of time. Mouse-tracking results showed that monolinguals’ mouse movements were attracted to native-language competitors, whereas bilinguals overcame competitor interference by increasing the activation of target items. Results suggest that bilinguals manage cross-linguistic interference more effectively than monolinguals. We conclude that language interference can affect lexical retrieval, but bilingualism may reduce this interference by facilitating access to a newly learned language. (shrink)

This article analyzes learning in context through the prism of a sustainable dairy-farming project. The research was performed within a nutrient management project that involved the participation of farmers and scientists. Differences between heterogeneous forms of farmers’ knowledge and scientific knowledge were discursively constructed during conflict and subsequent alignment over the validity and relevance of knowledge. Both conflict and alignment appeared to be essential for learning in context. Conflict spurred learning when disagreeing groups of actors developed their knowledge in order (...) to strengthen their arguments. Conflict caused self-referentiality when the actors no longer listened to each other. This inhibited self-reflection, thus blocking ongoing learning. Nevertheless, after a period of alignment, scientific models and knowledge of farmers were reevaluated and recontextualized. Through determining how to use scientific models and farmers’ knowledge for further learning, aimed at a shared goal, the participating actors also learned how to learn. (shrink)

This article analyzes learning in context through the prism of a sustainable dairy-farming project. The research was performed within a nutrient management project that involved the participation of farmers and scientists. Differences between heterogeneous forms of farmers’ knowledge and scientific knowledge were discursively constructed during conflict and subsequent alignment over the validity and relevance of knowledge. Both conflict and alignment appeared to be essential for learning in context. Conflict spurred learning when disagreeing groups of actors developed their knowledge in order (...) to strengthen their arguments. Conflict caused self-referentiality when the actors no longer listened to each other. This inhibited self-reflection, thus blocking ongoing learning. Nevertheless, after a period of alignment, scientific models and knowledge of farmers were reevaluated and recontextualized. Through determining how to use scientific models and farmers’ knowledge for further learning, aimed at a shared goal, the participating actors also learned how to learn. (shrink)

In middle childhood, boys show more avoidant attachments and girls more ambivalent attachments as a prelude to gender differentiation in reproductive strategies. However, we have failed to find systematic and method-independent gender differences in middle or late childhood attachments, nor in adult attachment representations. We conclude that Del Giudice's model rests on a brittle empirical basis.

The AGI alignment problem has a bimodal distribution of outcomes with most outcomes clustering around the poles of total success and existential, catastrophic failure. Consequently, attempts to solve AGI alignment should, all else equal, prefer false negatives (ignoring research programs that would have been successful) to false positives (pursuing research programs that will unexpectedly fail). Thus, we propose adopting a policy of responding to points of philosophical and practical uncertainty associated with the alignment problem by limiting and choosing necessary assumptions (...) to reduce the risk of false positives. Herein we explore in detail two relevant points of uncertainty that AGI alignment research hinges on---meta-ethical uncertainty and uncertainty about mental phenomena---and show how to reduce false positives in response to them. (shrink)

In a recent article Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and B. J. Strawser argue that in order for a decision in war to be just, or indeed the decision to resort to war to be just, it must be the case that the decision is made for the right reasons. Furthermore, they argue that this requirement holds regardless of how much good is produced by said action. In this essay I argue that their argument is flawed, in that it mistakes what (...) makes an agent morally good for what makes an act morally good. I argue that the main thrust of Purves et al.’s argument in fact undermines the conclusion they wish to draw, and that the reasons for one’s action do not make an in principle difference to the morality of actions in war. I further argue that this position undermines the traditional ad bellum just war constraint of right intention, and that the morality of actions in war is, at core, only concerned with outcomes. I conclude by clarifying that one’s reasons for action do in fact matter when deciding to enter war or kill in war, but only because one’s reasons significantly impact the way in which one acts. The purpose of this paper is to clear the theoretical space by showing why intentions/reasons do not in principle matter when assessing the morality of war (or killing), but this should not be taken as an argument that we should ignore intentions/reasons altogether. (shrink)